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November
11,
2007 |
David
Warsh, Editor |


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A Necessary Profession, Re-Invented
In Biography of a Subject: An Evolution of Development
Economics, Gerald M. Meier
describes the history of that policy-oriented branch from
its birth during the years of decolonization in the years
after World War II to the serious rethinking of its premises
that began in the 1970s and finally swept the field in the
1990s. Nobody is better qualified to write that history first
hand than Meier. When he was young, the profession scarcely
existed. By the mid-1950s, it was a flourishing community
of thinkers propounding a welter of conflicting ideas -- neoclassical
economic, Marxist and institutional. Meier truly was present
at the creation: he first imbibed
the topic as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford in 1949, and taught
it for forty years at Stanford University’s Graduate School
of Business, before retiring at 80 in 2003.
Meier divides the history of the field into two broad periods,
a first generation of students of development, holding forth
roughly from 1950 until 1975; and a second generation, which
took over from the founders towards the end of the 1970s.
About the identity of that first generation there can be little
argument. The cast of characters included Colin Clark,
Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, Ragnar Nurske, Gunnar Myrdal. Albert
Hirschman, Hans Singer, Celso Furtado, Raul Prebisch, Hla
Myint, W.W. Rostow, Alexander Gerschenkron, names that today
seem as burnished by fame and as remote in time as those of
the sea-faring adventurers who discovered, named, and misnamed
the New World four hundred years before. The fads and fashions
they debated -- planning vs. markets, autarky vs. international
trade, import substitution vs. tariff reduction, big pushes
vs. balanced growth, unvarying stages of growth vs. the advantages
of historical backwardness -- mainly seem quaint today, relics
of a time when nations seemed permanently divided into three
worlds: “first” (meaning industrial democracies); “second”
(meaning communist); and “third” (meaning poor and backwards).
That’s because a second generation of specialists in “globalization”
took over in the late 1970s and overshadowed the cacophony
of analytics with themes so reliably harmonious as to have
been described in 1990 by economist John Williamson as the
“Washington Consensus.” To Meier, these authorities
weren’t really development economists at all. Rather
they were defenders of orthodox mainstream economics against
the heresies of all the various special approaches -- believers
in “monoeconomics,” in Albert Hirschman’s phrase.
Sometimes known as “country doctors,” these counselors emphasized
a handful of policies as being suitable at all times to all
nations: collect taxes to cover public spending, exercise
fiscal restraint, control inflation, deregulate financial
markets, liberalize trade policy, permit foreign direct investment,
privatize government enterprises, and strengthen property
rights. Among the best known were Anne Krueger, of the
World Bank (Turkey); Jagdish Bhagwati, of Columbia University
(the World Trade Organization); the late Rudiger Dornbusch,
of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Brazil and Mexico);
Jeffrey Sachs, of Harvard University and now Columbia (Bolivia
and Poland); and Anders Aslund, of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace (Russia).
But in the last few years, a third generation has emerged,
more like the first but with the benefit of having gone to
school under professors of the second in order to sharpen
their arguments. For the most part, these are economists who
entered graduate school in the 1980s and 1990s, though Joseph
Stiglitz, who had his training in the 1960s, became an eloquent
critic of the Washington Consensus while serving as chief
economist of the World Bank. Stiglitz, a Nobel laureate, now
of Columbia, afterwards wrote a couple of best-sellers:
The Roaring Nineties and Globalization and its Discontents. Meanwhile, not just Japan and the Asia Tigers -- Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore -- but China, India, Brazil and
Russia demonstrated that policies that were no part of the
Washington Consensus could produce sustained growth.
Now, with the appearance of One Economics, Many Recipes, by Dani Rodrik, of Harvard University’s Kennedy School
of Government, the new development economics has acquired
a rallying point, and a new leader.
One way to describe Rodrik is as the man who replaced Jeff
Sachs. His program in international development occupies the
physical space at the Kennedy School that Sachs vacated when
he moved to Columbia five years ago to become the world’s
foremost advocate of directed investment in public health
measures. In recent months, though, since reading Rodrik’s
book, I have begun to think of him as the man who has replaced
Albert Hirschman as the exemplary critic of monoeconomics.
The US Social Science Research Council made it much easier
to think in these terms by creating an Albert
O. Hirschman Prize and, earlier this month, giving the
first one to Rodrik.
“Hirschman’s central insights on development have held up
extremely well,” he said in his acceptance speech. “The key
lesson of the last half-century is that policy makers have
to be strategic, rather than comprehensive. They have to do
the best with what they have instead of wishing they can transform
their society wholesale. They have to identify priorities
and opportunities and work off them. They have to seek sequential,
cumulative change over time rather than comprehensive change
at the outset.”
One Economics, Many Recipes has been receiving increasing attention, thanks in part to a symposium
organized by Henry Farrell, of George Washington University,
on Crooked Timber, a widely-read
collective blog he shares with a number of other authors (EP
contributed a piece to the discussion.) For a quick overview,
you can’t do better than to read in its entirety the brief
version of the talk Rodrik gave last week in Princeton.
Quickest of all is the summary he posted on his blog.
[I] have been spending some time with the great man's writings.
Somewhat ironically in light of my own research interests,
I found that I was a lot more familiar with Hirschman's
generalist works -- Exit, Voice and Loyalty
and The Passions and the Interests
are among my all-time favorite books -- than his work on
development proper.
Reading this work, I am awed once again by a mind
which was as much at ease with the technical arcana
of irrigation projects as it was with the rarified world
of political philosophy.
Yet I can also see why he must have been such
a source of frustration for his contemporaries. He was in many
ways the ultimate contrarian--always looking for the unique
and the exceptional, while not shying from building
general theories from those cases. He was a critic
of the reigning development theories of his time (the big
push and balanced growth), arguing, quite
correctly in my view, that the under-developed societies
who had the capacity to implement these comprehensive
programs would not have been under-developed in the
first place. He argued instead for a strategic, opportunistic
approach, based on making the best of what you have.
Successful countries do share some common
elements. They all provide some degree of effective property
rights protection and contract enforcement, maintain macroeconomic
stability, seek to integrate in the world economy, and ensure
an appropriate environment for productive diversification
and innovation. What differs is the manner in which these
ends are achieved. For example, greater integration with world
markets can be achieved via export subsidies (South Korea),
export-processing zones (Malaysia), investment incentives
to multinational enterprises (Singapore), special economic
zones (China), regional free trade agreements (Mexico), or
straight import liberalization (Chile). Appropriate
policy design is always contingent on local conditions: it
takes advantage of pre-existing advantages and seeks to overcome
domestic constraints. That is the reason why successful
reform often does not travel well....
Hirschman would be aghast at the extent of intrusion into
domestic policy making that the WTO or the IMF today engage
in. As international bureaucracies with a penchant for “best
practices” and common standards, these institutions are
peculiarly unsuited to the task of seeking innovative, unique
pathways suited to each countries’ own circumstances. He
would no doubt chide developing country governments for
not living up to their responsibilities and for passing
on the buck so freely to these external agencies. For ultimately,
it is up to each country to say, “thanks, but no thanks;
I will do it my way.”
Long before he became known as an economist,
Albert Hirschman made his name forging passports for refugees
in Vichy Marseilles, conducting refugees over the Pyrenees (disguised
as a shepherd, but with a copy
of Montaigne in his pocket), being the last man out himself.
It was only then that he began his career as a social scientist,
on the research staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Those months of continuing opposition
to the threat of death -- of resistance -- gave a moral force
to Exit, Voice and Loyalty that couldn’t have been gotten in any other way.
Rodrik doesn’t have that kind of resume. These days, who
does? But there is another interesting resemblance. Hirschman
came to the United States from Berlin; his long-time friend
and colleague, Alexander Gerschenkron, of Harvard, from Russia.
Neither man nursed much affection for the country he had fled.
If, as was suggested here
a couple of years ago, Daron Acemoglu, of MIT, is the man
who best exemplifies economists’ (renewed) interest in institutions
for which Gerschenkron once served as a rump symbol of economics’
inability to deal, Rodrik is the inheritor of Hirschman. How
reassuring is it about the trend of things that both men not
only come from Turkey, but retain their Turkish citizenship?
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