Towards the end of his life, the economist
Charles P. Kindleberger tumbled with great excitement on to
One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago,
by Homer Hoyt. Published in 1933, Hoyt's book traced in great detail
five cycles of boom and bust in the Windy City, starting with
the huge run-up in land prices that accompanied the railroad
boom of the 1850s and 1860s, which set values that in some
cases were not seen again until the end of the 1920s, so stubborn
was the resolve of speculators to see their bets pay off.
In 1871, according to one Chicago writer,
"every other man and every fourth woman had an investment
in house lots" -- properties they were determined not
to sell at less than their hoped-for profit, much less at
a loss, unless taxes and interest rates ground them down.
The lesson that Kindleberger took away from Hoyt was that
in boom times, speculative markets rise together, but they
lose their steam at very different rates. He wrote real estate
into the third edition (1996) of his classic Manias,
Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. Expect
a downturn in real estate to follow a stock market crash,
but with a substantial lag.
Perhaps the best way of understanding today's
jitters over sub-prime mortgage lending is as an aftershock
from the tech bubble of 2001 -- not the start of something
new but the threatened unwinding of positions taken by investors
who now must deal with a hangover from a bout of euphoria
-- balloon payments, negative equity and so on. If that's the case, the crisis can be expected to resolve without
the painful meltdown of various injudicious banking institutions
that, for now at least, remains a real possibility.
The standard response will unfold. Federal
banking regulators will tighten up, mortgage bankers will
act more cautiously, and the hedge funds who bought a dizzying
array of collateralized debt obligations will scramble to
devise new market mechanisms to assess the real worth of their
portfolios. Meanwhile, far removed from the spotlight, others
will be setting in motion the new technologies and financial
tools that eventually will enable the next great craze.
Not a bad time, therefore, to take a longer
view of the process. Two books have appeared this summer that
shine some light on the time-honored propensity of markets
and governments to overdo things: Pop:
Why Bubbles Are Great for the Economy, by Daniel
Gross; and Surviving
Large Losses: Financial Crises, the Middle Class, and the
Development of Capital Markets, by Philip Hoffman, Gilles
Postel-Vinay and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal.
Now I'm a journalist and I like journalism.
Gross is a peripatetic newsman, having written for Slate, The New Republic, New
York, Wired and The New York Times. He has a good solid grounding in the work of professional
historians, as well -- a master's degree in history from
Harvard University and a collaboration with Davis Dyer that
produced Generations of Corning: 150 Years in the
Life of a Global Corporation, 1851-2000.
So Pop
is a beguiling read, well-informed and shrewd in its judgments. Gross's argument is that bubbles are the result of an essential
aspect of American character, that the US government often
has had a hand in making them happen, and that they can be
useful when they leave behind a commercial infrastructure
that others can use. There are snappy chapters on the history of the telegraph,
the railroads, the financial New Deal (meaning the "set of
regulations, insurance schemes and government backstops" that
were created to restore confidence eroded by the stock market
Crash of 1929 and subsequent Depression), the Internet, real
estate and alternative energy (his nominee for the next new
thing).
If the conclusion sounds as if it was written
to be performed by movie star Tom Cruise ("When it comes to
business, the United States is like a shooting guard, who,
heedless of the air-ball he hoisted a minute before, stands
twenty-three feet from the basket and demands the ball as
the clock ticks down. Excess confidence? A lack of awareness
of one's limitations?
Sure. But it also signifies an ability to not
let recent failure stymie new efforts"),
the book itself is still better than average magazine
writing. And that is precisely where Gross has pitched his
tent and staked his claim. While keeping his weekly "Moneybox" column
at Slate, he is adding a bi-weekly column in Newsweek, replacing the venerable Allan Sloan, who has moved
to Fortune. Good news for those of us who value running
commentary.
Surviving Large Losses
is a very different sort of book. The authors are distinguished
economic historians, Hoffman and Rosenthal at the California
Institute of Technology, Postel-Vinay at the École des Haute
Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. Despite its slim size (258pp.) and apparent
lack of formal methods, theirs is a deeply serious essay --
a worthy companion to Kindleberger's book, perhaps even an
alternative to it, inasmuch as its treatment is less descriptive
and more analytic of the political economy of crises. These
authors, too, believe that it makes sense to look past the
headlines -- "global credit woes" -- for the deeper evolution
that is taking place. They find their explanations in the
strategic situations facing various players in the drama --
politicians, investors, business folk, global lenders --
and in the institutions that guide and proscribe their conduct.
Financial crises may be a hardy perennial,
the authors note, but they come in many shapes and sizes (crises
defined simply as occurring whenever a large number of contracts
are broken). The government of the United States routinely
undertakes bailouts to make certain that large losses do not
occur, bailing out banks, pension plans, even hedge funds
such as Long Term Capital Management, in order to make certain
that its citizens do not suffer large losses. Yet the governments
of other nations -- Germany, memorably, in the 1920s;
Argentina in 2001 -- default on the debt they owe their citizens,
freeze bank accounts or devalue the currency, which has the
same effect, of imposing large costs on investors. Why the
difference?
The authors trace it back to the origins
of public finance in Western Europe, 500 years ago, when monarchs
learned to borrow from bankers to meet emergency expenses
beyond what could be raised in taxes. Such public debt turned
out to be a blessing, nurturing capital markets and stimulating
growth (often mainly by fighting wars), unless the debt became
too great. At some point, governments would default on their
obligations, imposing large losses on lenders and stimulating
the search for means of preventing a repetition.
The idea of a "danger zone" is introduced -- an
imprecise but thoroughly recognizable threshold of indebtedness
at which the temptation to default rather than repay would
become irresistible.
Three big innovations have been introduced
over the centuries, designed to permit nations to escape from
the trap of repeated default.
One is simply the idea that the level of public debt
must be manageable, relative to the tax revenues government
expects to receive.
(This magnitude of an acceptable limit may vary greatly
according to the customs of the nation in question, of course.)
Another is the recognition that sufficient financial information
must be available to inspire confidence among would-be investors
-- usually but not always mandated and enforced by governmental
authority.
Finally, a large and powerful middle class
is the most reliable guardian of good conduct by a state;
almost invariably that has meant democracy. These broad institutions
have evolved in response to periodic financial crises over
the last several centuries, the authors say. Their effect
has been to diminish both the frequency and amplitude of crises,
and the sudden losses imposed by accident and design by unsuspecting
wealth-holders.
The excitement of Surviving Large Losses is not easy to convey. It is a different kind of thinking
cap, that's all. On every page it reflects the substantial
changes wrought by political economists during the past thirty
years or so in the way we understand the sources of the wealth
and poverty of nations. It delivers a profoundly optimistic
message, however -- that eventually we get wise to ourselves;
that gradually financial knavery is reduced; that by learning
from our mistakes we are creating a more stable financial
order, and perhaps even a more just world.
The authors end on a somber note, considering
the mounting tensions between population growth and expectations
of the welfare state, both in the industrial democracies and
the developing nations. But even here, the upside of crisis
is apparent. Is there an "entitlement" bubble? Must the dream of the middle class be
written down, at least for a generation or two? Perhaps nothing
more than a haircut will be required. The moral of Surviving
Large Losses is that what doesn't kill the capital markets makes
us stronger.