When economists gathered in 2001 at Columbia University to
honor Edmund Phelps with a festschrift,
it was a celebratory conference. The truly remarkable thing
was the temperamental diversity of the cast of characters.
Paul Samuelson gave the opening talk. Robert Lucas presided
over one series of papers, Robert Solow over another. Thomas
Sargent and Michael Woodford contributed; so did Olivier Blanchard,
James Heckman, Robert Hall, Joseph Stiglitz, N. Gregory Mankiw,
Steve Nickell, Jean-Paul Fitoussi, Daron Acemoglu and Charles
Jones.
For a couple of days then, the scene on Morningside Heights
resembled those famous Edward Hicks paintings of "The Peaceable
Kingdom", wolf and lamb, leopard and goat, calf and lion,
colonials and native Americans, side by side at noble ease,
and, in the center of it all, instead of a young child, Ned
Phelps.
It was a rich reward for a scholar who hadn't reached the
public pinnacle of the profession, and might never.
After all, Robert Lucas had been honored six years earlier
with a Nobel Prize for work that built on Phelps' great papers.
A full quarter century before, Milton Friedman had been honored
with a Nobel for, among other things, his "demonstration of the complexity of stabilization policy"
-- a critique of the reigning dogma nearly identical to one
that Phelps had made a few months earlier, but which, unlike
that of Phelps, offered no apparatus to put in that dogma's
place.
Last week the Swedes made good on the lapse in their narrative,
and the world was introduced at last to both a master economist
and to a controversy long resolved, to good effect. Phelps,
73, who obtained his PhD from Yale in 1959, started working
immediately at a high level, and has never stopped.
The Nobel committee cited him for the hard scientific work
in the late 1960s and early 1970s that was necessary to pin
down and communicate the central insight that he and then
Friedman had broached within a few months of one another in
1967 and 1968 -- that easy money would have, at best, only
a temporary effect on unemployment, and that in fact there
was a "natural rate" of unemployment in any economy that could
be addressed only by more fundamental measures.
In the 1960s, the Keynesian orthodoxy celebrated as the "new
economics" was dominated by the empirical regularity known
as the Phillips Curve -- the relationship between inflation
and the unemployment rates, first observed by New Zealand
economist A.W. Phillips, and subsequently nominated by Samuelson
and Solow in 1960 as the basis for a plausible policy -- accept
slightly higher rates of inflation in order to reduce unemployment.
In contrast, Phelps deployed a series of original and carefully-reasoned
models of individual decision-making, arguing that successive
doses of inflation would lose their effectiveness once they
were incorporated into expectations. He sought to ground his
explanation of the lofty macroeconomic variable -- output,
inflation, unemployment -- in the analysis of wage-setting
and spending decisions of firms and households, a decisive
step in the direction of greater realism.
(In one famous model, he conjured up a series of islands
to represent the plight of investors and workers possessing
very different sets of information and expectations of the
state of the economy. "The actors of [our] model have to cope
ignorant of the future and even much of the present. Isolated
and apprehensive, these Pinteresque figures construct expectations
of the state of the economyÉ and maximize relative to that
imagined world.")
In a retrospective essay some years ago, Phelps wrote: "It
might be thought that the late 1960s modeling of the Phillips
curve and, as a byproduct, the natural rate of unemployment,
grew out of great agitation and yearning for light.
"In fact, the Keynes-Phillips orthodoxy was sailing on smooth
waters, the object of much congratulation, rather like the
liner Titanic prior to its collision with the fateful iceberg."
Instead, he wrote, his inspiration had its origin in deep
cogitation during the summer he spent in Cambridge, England,
in 1966, and during his first few months that fall as a newly
minted professor at the University of Pennsylvania.
"Man is a thinking, expectant being!" Phelps wrote many years
later, recalling his train of thought at the time. "What was
needed was a model of a sequence: the firm's expectations,
its subsequent actions and those of the others, the discovery
of the others' actions, the formation of new expectations,
and so forth."
A great commotion then ensued with defenders of the dominant
Keynesian orthodoxy, from which Phelps and many others eventually
emerged, not so much disillusioned as, rather, born-again
"new Keynesians," Much of that action took place at Penn.
It was there in January 1969 that Phelps convened an informal
conference (with the backing of the National Science Foundation's
James Blackman and publisher Donald Lamm) that appeared a
year later as Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and
Inflation Theory -- the
"Phelps volume," as it quickly became known. And for
the next few years, the construction of coherent micro foundations
for Keynesian macroeconomics was all the rage.
When the shouting subsided, many
of the intellectual landmarks of the present age had been
created. Robert Lucas had installed the idea of forward-looking
rational expectations at the center of monetary policy. Edward
Prescott and Finn Kydland had shown that the decision-making
process of monetary authorities was best understood as a strategic
game involving credibility and commitment. Guillermo Calvo
and John Taylor had begun their work on targets, rules and
transparency. The path to the present-day understanding of
monetary policy was clear. Central banks were no longer expected
to manage the unemployment rate.
Philippe Aghion, a Harvard professor
who advocated a Nobel award to Phelps as powerfully as anyone,
thinks that logically the prize should have been given jointly
with Lucas in 1996. Maybe so; maybe not: there is an intensely
personal quality to Phelps' work that is the polar opposite
of Lucas's. Nowhere is that more conspicuously or attractively
on display than in Phelps introductory textbook, Political
Economy, which appeared
in 1985. Deemed too demanding for all but the brightest students,
the book ranged widely over the history of thought, from game
theory to the philosophy of justice, from Marx to Keynes --and
featured a quotation from classic films at the top of every
chapter.
The Nobel citation last week
dwelt on a second skein of Phelps' work, his earliest work,
on capital accumulation, especially a paper published in 1961
under the whimsical title "The Golden Rule of Accumulation:
A Fable for Growthmen." Several other economists reached similar
conclusions at more or less the same time, and Phelps later
wrote "Within a few short years [of entering the profession]
I became an internationally known economist. Yet I came
to feel that I was simply winning (or losing) foot-races by
a few steps. I saw that if I was to do anything of unusual
depth or distinctiveness I would have to think much harder
than I had generally done -- to raise the level of my game."
In the next few years, that is
exactly what he did. "There is, as I was to appreciate
better, a big difference between scanning existing models
for their unnoticed implications, on the one hand, and, on
the other, acquiring an independent empirical sense of some
overlooked or misunderstood way the economy works."
Ned Phelps will give the prize
lecture in economics in Stockholm on December 8.
(The long wait for a call from
Stockholm that might never come insured that there would be
an abundance of material on Phelps' career available, regardless
of whether it did or not. The proceedings of the 2001 Festschrift are collected in a fat paperback: Knowledge,
Information and Expectations in Modern Macroeconomics, edited by Philippe Aghion, Roman Frydman, Joseph Stiglitz
and Michael Woodford. A beguiling autobiographical essay
can be found on Phelps' website (http://www.columbia.edu/~esp2/), as
well as a retrospective essay on the evolution of the idea
of the natural rate of unemployment.)
* * *
Harvard University's administration
has quietly concluded its deliberations in the Andrei Shleifer
matter, stripping him of his endowed chair but otherwise making
no public finding.
Shleifer said the case against
him for his stewardship of Harvard's failed Russia project
is finally closed.
Interim dean Jeremy Knowles last
week told the Harvard Crimson that "appropriate action" had
been taken and communicated to Shleifer, but didn't say what
it was, citing privacy concerns.
Shleifer emailed the student
newspaper from Amsterdam, where he was giving a lecture, "I
am delighted that this matter is full behind me. I look forward
to following [Knowles] advice and focusing my energies fully
on scholarship, teaching, and on service to economics and
to Harvard."
The Boston Globe reported the
next day that the university's web page no longer identified
Shleifer as the Whipple VanNess Jones professor of economics.
The rank had been conferred on him in 2002 by then-Dean Knowles,
not long after the US government had charged him and the university
itself with fraud in the conduct of the advisory team he led
in Russia. "I was a professor of economics last week, and
I am a professor of economics this week," Shleifer told the
Globe's Marcella Bombardieri Friday.
A seven-member faculty Committee
on Professional Conduct forwarded a report on the affair to
Knowles last summer. Crimson reporter Javier Hernandez
wrote last week that "Several committee members are upset
with the dean's management of the issue and some have questioned
whether the case was handled fairly, according to two individuals
who have spoken with professors on the committee."
The way is finally cleared for
Shleifer to publish the defense of his actions that he has
promised his supporters.