The great promise of economics
is that it enables us see things relatively whole. Sometimes,
however, thanks to various blinders imposed by its methods,
it presents a seriously distorted view of costs and benefits.
Usually this has to do with leaving things out.
Two cases in point arose last
week.
At the World Trade Organization
meetings in Hong Kong, diplomats from 149 nations postponed
for a year the toughest issues in the latest round of negotiations.
Robert Samuelson, the redoubtable economics columnist for
Newsweek and its parent, The Washington Post, puzzled over the failure of eight successful rounds
of liberalization since World War II to make much headway
against farm subsidies.
No nation gets rich by keeping
its people in agriculture, wrote Samuelson: "Few economic
laws are so clear." In 1820, some seventy percent of
the US workforce worked on farms; today the figure is less
than two percent. For France, Britain and Japan, comparable
figures today are four percent, one percent and five percent.
Yet many highly industrialized
countries persist in subsidizing inefficient farmers.
Subsidies, in the form of direct payments and protective tariffs,
represent around 60 percent of total farm income In Japan
and Korea, 34 percent in the European Union and 20 percent
in the United States. Newly industrializing countries, sunch
as China and India, rely mainly on tariffs to keep out cheap
grain.
Why don't the rich countries,
the Europeans in particular, drop the barriers and buy their
food from the low-cost producers, chiefly from farmers in
the Third World and the United States? Abolishing agriculture
subsidies around the world would make everybody better off,
concluded Samuelson. "Except politically, the food fight makes
no sense."
What the argument leaves out
is the fact that, in Europe especially, agricultural subsidies
are simply the most visible aspect of a long-standing land-use
policy designed to maintain the balance between cities and
towns the open land surrounding them. The subsidies are investments
in aesthetics and social continuity.
It is not a simple matter to
place a pecuniary value on the importance that European citizens
attach to maintaining landscapes relatively little-changed
over a period of a century. That does not mean the value is
not intensely felt and widely shared.
Americans, in contrast, attach
relatively little value to harmonious landscapes. The result
is greater flexibility -- and greater sprawl and blight as
well.
Trade diplomats understand these
different preferences and take them into account. They
have sought ways to distinguish between subsidies designed
to benefit the biggest agricultural producers (export subsidies,
chiefly) and those whose object is mainly to protect traditional
uses of land. Those export subsidies are now in the WTO's
cross-hairs. But the rhetoric of free trade economics hasn't
caught up with the more sophisticated understanding of practitioners.
The assumption of similar and unchanging preferences is one
of economics' great blind spots.
In a somewhat similar fashion,
Wall Street Journal columnist Holman W. Jenkins Jr. last week
continued sniping at consumers who had bought Prius automobiles,
the gasoline-electric automobiles introduced by Toyota Motor
Co. in 1999. Such "hybrid" cars are marketed at least
partly on the basis of their fuel efficiency -- as much as
60 miles per gallon in city driving.
Yet on the basis of comparisons
with the Honda Civic or the Toyota Corolla, which cost around
$9,500 less, Prius owners would have to drive 66,500 miles
a year or the price of gasoline would have to climb to $10
a gallon before Prius owners can expect to come out ahead
of owners of small conventional cars. Thus Prius owners are
"suckers," he suggests.
All kinds of dubious assumptions
are concealed here: that the market price of hybrid
cars is independent of the scale of their manufacture; that
the price of a gallon of gasoline in the United States is
about where it should be and is likely to remain; that automotive
carbon dioxide emissions form no part of the problem. Probably
all three are mistaken.
First, technological change is
a big part of the process. When Henry Ford began selling his
Model T in increasing numbers, the price dropped from more
than $1,000 to $345 in a matter of years. Similar technological
improvements can be expected in the price/performance ratios
of hybrid cars in coming years, as their popularity grows.
(Perhaps, you think, the expectation
that costs will fall as quality increases explains Toyota's commitment to the Prius, but not that of consumers?
Shouldn't they wait an additional few more years until the
price drops? Prius customers don't hold back for the
same reasons that Ford's first buyers didn't hesitate: personal
commitment, fashion, status, etc. -- and economic theorizing
that fails to take account of differing preferences is as
powerless to explain Ford's success in retrospect as to explain
Toyota's success today.)
Then, too, Jenkins expects energy
prices to stay about where they are today. With global demand
for oil surging, particularly in China and India, most forecasters
expect oil to remain at $50 a barrel for years, with a few
predicting spikes to $100 or more.
Finally, the likelihood of a
concerted policy response to global warming, mainly in the
form of higher taxes, plays no part in Jenkins' story. Fears
of resource shortages and climate change have kept taxes on
gasoline high in Europe for years, he notes. With gas
at around $5 a gallon, no fewer than 39 automotive models
are available that average more than 50 miles per gallon,
compared with just two in the United States, where gas has
been closer to $2 a gallon. To his mind, though, those
higher European taxes have little to do with a rational response
to global warming. Instead they stem mainly from a desire
to "feed the welfare state and keep the autobahns clear of
poor people."
Jenkins says his goal was "to
debunk the idea that saving gasoline is a virtue independent
of economics, such that it makes sense, say, to spend a buck
to reduce gas use by 50 cents."
But by garlanding about his calculations
with static assumptions about technology and supply and demand,
and by ignoring the external effects of consumption at a time
when global warming has become front-page news, Jenkins does
economics no service. Indeed, he makes those Prius buyers
look pretty good -- by ignoring an impending adjustment to
the consequences of industrialization that may be as disruptive
as the process of industrialization itself.