A good newspaper column puts a human face on a truth-seeking
collectivity whose organizing principle otherwise may be too
fragmentary to easily grasp. Such a lot of bright people are
writing columns about business and economic matters these
days.
Among them are Thomas Friedman and Paul Krugman in the New
York Times; Homan Jenkins, Alan Murray and David Wessel in
The Wall Street Journal; Robert Samuelson and Allan Sloan
in Newsweek; and, in The Washington Post, Paul Blustein, who
is not a columnist but should be. (His new book is And
The Money Kept Rolling In (And Out): Wall Street, the IMF
and the Bankrupting of Argentina.)
My absolute favorite columnists, however, are to be found
in the stable of The Financial Times. There is Lucy Kellaway,
for example, who writes on workplace issues under her own
name on Mondays, and her evil twin, the fictitious executive
Martin Lukes, whose ever-self-seeking emails occasionally
appear elsewhere in the paper, a serial novel chronicling
his attempts to make his way to the top of A-B Global at the
expense of all and sundry.
And then there is the best economic columnist in the world,
or at least the best one writing in English. That would be
Martin
Wolf. His columns are one thing, but I heard him talk
this week. He is a man (very quietly) on fire.
What does it take to be good at column-writing? Enthusiasm
for the subject, the ability to understand and communicate
it, a leash long enough to follow through, and enough of the
showboat to attract attention. In Wolf's case the subject
is macroeconomics.
That sounds important, and it is. But so inherently
dry is the topic, and, in Wolf's case, so restrained is the
showmanship (though it is an unmistakable part of the act),
that my aim here is simply to call a little additional attention
to what is going on.
Outside of treasuries, central banks, international lending
organizations, economics departments and foreign exchange
desks, not enough people know about Martin Wolf.
A recent (and very good) book, Why
Globalization Works, will help somewhat. But the real
action is in the columns.
On the surface, there is nothing in his history to lead you
to expect that Wolf would function well as a journalist. Born
in 1946, he was trained as an applied economist at Oxford
in the late 1960s. For a decade he worked at the World Bank
under Robert McNamara, at a time when Holllis Chenery was
the bank's chief economist.
Working first in east Africa, then in India, Wolf "learned
first-hand the damage done by dirigiste,
inward-looking economic policies," not just because of their
grotesque inefficiencies, but because of the corruption they
engendered. He read his Hayek, and gradually came round to
the view that, about most things, Peter Bauer, the vociferous
critic of aid programs, was right after all. So he quit the
Bank in 1981 and became research director of the Trade Policy
Research Centre in London, with a view to framing issues for
the next round of trade negotiations.
But it turns out that Wolf's father had been a writer, a
playwright who had fled Austria for London before World War
II. His mother arrived from Holland, where thirty aunts, uncles
and cousins who remained behind were killed by the Nazis.
The young man grew up in an intensely literary and political
household.
When his thinly-capitalized think-tank ran short on funds
in 1987, not long after the Uruguay Round finally got underway,
Wolf found himself looking for work. It was then that
the FT's then-editor, Geoffrey Owen, offered him a job as
chief economics editorial writer for the paper. "I had
never been -- or intended to become -- a journalist," Wolf has
written. He took to it naturally, however, and soon
began the kind of indeprendent and informed reconnaissance
that is the essence of good journalism.
Why Globalization Works,
which appeared last year, is a book of history and instruction.
It is narrower in its aims than John McMillan's Reinventing
the Bazaar, more reportorial than Jagdish Bhagwati's In
Defense of Globalization.
Its moral is that the international trading system broke down
before, in the interval between 1914 and 1945, and that it
could happen again.
Nearly half the book is devoted to rebutting a series of
arguments against the international trading system -- that
it fosters inequality, despoils the environment, aggrandizes
the power of corporations at the expense of legitimate states,
and increases volatility. "The sight of the affluent young
in the west wishing to protect the poor of the world from
the processes that delivered their own remarkable prosperity
is depressing." And all this background is history is very
useful.
But the real action is in the columns. There is something
about the flow of news that lends itself to being covered
in columnar form. Things change, and the commentator must
fit them into a coherent pattern. Formerly the role was performed
by the FT's singular Samuel Brittan,
but after thirty years at the center of tumultuous events,
he has gone emeritus (though as his most recent collection,
Against the
Flow demonstrates, he has scarcely lost his touch.)
Now the center ring belongs to Wolf.
The centerpiece of Wolf's recent analysis is a series of
four columns late last year, based on reporting the most recent
discussion among international economists in governments and
out, analyzing the nature of the growing interdependence between
Asia and the United States -- and the danger posed by circumstances
in which the US serves as the world's "borrower of last resort."
That the economies of Japan, "old Europe" and the Middle
East should be running surpluses and seeking save haven for
their investments was not surprising, Wolf noted, since they
are old and rich. But the fact that non-Japan Asia was lending
large sums to the world's richest economy required some explaining,
since China and India were the world's most dynamic economies.
Why were they exporting rather than importing capital?
The answer, he hinted (and since has said), was to be found
in the Asian nations' experience of the financial crises of
1997 and '98, when after a decade of open-handed lending to
the developing economies, American officials jetted around
the Pacific telling governments which parts of their overheated
economies to shut down.
Throughout that dangerous time, the US economy ran at full
steam, keeping the rest of the world going as importer of
last resort -- and, for a little while, the strong dollar still
went a long way. Then the system tipped. In order to
forestall a global recession, the United States cut taxes
dramatically -- not once, but twice -- and a large portion of
the world's savings began flowing to the US to buy government
bonds to finance its government deficits.
Many misleading stories were told about the attractiveness
of the US economy to foreign investment at the time, Wolf
noted -- that US real rates of return were high, that its economy
was growing faster than anywhere else, that the tax cuts were
solely to blame for America's trade deficit. In fact, he said,
the prices of US exports had gotten out of line, and could
only be cured by a sizable depreciation of the dollar.
The trouble was that Asian nations were keeping the dollar
artificially high by loading up on dollars for their reserve
accounts, in order to keep their own currencies low. Why was
it, he asked, that the Chinese government would export
real goods to the US in exchange for pieces of paper whose
value will tumble when the Chinese government seeks to trade
them in?" Only in order to avoid the slump that inevitably
would occur when its own currency appreciated against the
dollar.
The moral, Wolf wrote, was that it takes two to tango.
There was no point in reflexively bashing the US for its profligate
ways, since the surging nations of Asia were deeply complicit.
"But the dance is becoming ever-wilder... It is
necessary to halt before serious injury occurs."
That was December. Last week, both the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank issued warnings about the
growing codependence. But no longer is it reasonable
to go on browbeating Americans about their willingness to
"live beyond" their means when the Chinese are willing to
lend them the necessary wherewithal for little more than nothing.
What is the answer? According to Wolf, it is an all-around
adjustment -- a tacit agreement on the part of the US to slow
its consumption, of China to begin importing capital instead
of exporting it, and of all other nations to play their parts
in arranging an orderly decline in the value of the dollar
until its current-account deficit is something like half of
its current level of nearly 6 percent of GDP.
Only then will exchange-rate risks become such that private
investors will return to the game, permitting the system to
regain its tendencies to milder forms self-equilibration.
Otherwise, the world is headed for a wicked crash. "Continent-sized
countries should not go on playing the mercantilist game of
piling up reserves indefinitely," Wolf says of China.
Sound complicated? It is. International economics is
terribly difficult to translate into newspaper language of
cause and effect, which is why it must be followed on a systematic
basis; otherwise, it doesn't make sense. Wolf appears on Wednesdays
and alternate Fridays, covering the most exciting economic
story of our times.