Robert L. Bartley died last week. He was a loving husband and
father, a loyal employer, and something of a genius of a newspaperman.
His proudest boast, that for 30 years he had run "the only
editorial page in the country that actually sold newspapers,"
was unconditionally true. For more than a million readers, it
was the only must-read of the day.
But it is also the case that, as an editorialist, more than
any other, Bob Bartley was a corrosive force in American life.
Almost single-handedly, he made extremism respectable.
It is important to understand how that happened, and what
it portends.
He was born in Marshall, Minnesota, in 1937, and raised in
Ames, Iowa, where his father was a professor of veterinary medicine.
He attended college there, at Iowa State University, served
in the Army Reserve, and obtained a master's degree in
political science from the University of Wisconsin before going
to work in 1962 in Chicago for The Wall Street Journal. Three
years later he joined the editorial page, becoming its editor
in 1972.
His career merits the attention of a careful and perpendicular
biographer. Having voted for Lyndon Johnson over Barry Goldwater
in 1964, he turned away from Johnson, turned away, too, from
Richard Nixon, in the course of a conversion that is too little
understood.
In the 1960s and 1970s, there were many currents running in
the new conservatism. Among other places they found expression
in magazines such as The Public Interest, Commentary and Encounter.
There was in fact a Movement, or at least a Counter-Movement
in those days. Much of it had little to do with the press. But
under Bartley's leadership, the editorial page of The Wall
Street Journal gradually gained currency and the others lost.
Just at the moment it was about to pass in front of the reviewing
stand, Bartley had appeared at the front of a great parade.
Trouble is, Bartley (and his then-sidekick, editorial writer
Jude Wanniski) had become enthralled by a pair of rogue economists,
Arthur Laffer and Robert Mundell. Having fled the complicated
methodological battles that had begun in the department of economics
at the University of Chicago in the 1970s, Mundell and Laffer
became convinced that they had discovered a workable "supply-side"
policy against inflation. Quite untethered by professional norms,
they prepared to sell their ideas to the public, with Bartley
and a few others serving as intermediaries.
Never mind tight money; Paul Volcker and Ronald Reagan had
come up with that on their own. Never mind tax cuts; the rationale
for those went back to John Kennedy, during whose administration
Mundell had toiled as a young post-doc at the International
Monetary Fund. The emphasis on lowering marginal rates was probably
useful and certainly new. But Mundell's real secret weapon
for stability (and thus Bartley's) was the gold standard -- then, as now, an antiquated and essentially crackpot
scheme.
In international security matters, Bartley did better. Strategist
Albert Wohlstetter may have been his chief guru, and much of
his writing on the Soviet Union seems prescient. His biggest
embarrassment was a noisy crusade against "Yellow Rain,"
a campaign of biological warfare that the Soviet Union was alleged
to be conducting against tribesmen in remote areas of Southeast
Asia in the late 1970s. The "Yellow Rain" samples
proffered by the State Department turned out to be bee feces,
dropped by swarms during seasonal cleansing flights. No credible
alternative weapon delivery system was ever produced.
But Bartley's dogged refusal to grapple with his critics'
claims, or to back off his original charges after the government
retreated and even the news pages of his own newspaper reported
that the case had all but collapsed, became a metaphor for his
tendency to put his fingers in his ears and raise his voice
when contradicted by the evidence. And when an antagonist produced
irrefutable evidence that Bartley had been right about
another Soviet germ warfare controversy, the accidental anthrax
epidemic in Sverdlovsk, Bartley ignored that evidence too. The
fingers stayed in the ears.
(For an a glimpse of a somewhat similar controversy between
heterodox and established opinion on an otherwise unrelated
manner, see the cover
story on nanotechnology is an issue of Chemical and Engineering
News earlier this month. It takes the form of an extended exchange
between K. Eric Drexler of the Foresight Institute in Palo Alto,
Calif., and Professor Richard E. Smalley of Rice University.
(Drexler is the author of a famous 1986 book, "Engines
of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology," in which
the possibilities of molecular manufacturing were introduced
to a wide audience for the first time. Drexler, a Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Ph.D., anticipated the possibility that
the "molecular assemblers" he envisaged might eventually
pose a threat to human control. He established his Foreight
Institute to warn against the possibility, and other technology
gurus have followed suit: Michael Crichton in the science fiction
novel Prey, and Sun Microsystems chief scientist Bill Joy in
a widely-read article in Wired magazine called "Why the
Future Doesn't Need Us."
(Smalley, who won a Nobel Prize for discovery of the 60-atom
carbon molecules now known as fullerenes (after architect Buckminster
Fuller), has pressed for a decade dor a coordinated national
research program in nanotechnology, on grounds that potential
benefits of concrete applications are very great. But his has
disparaged Drexler's alarms on scientific grounds. Their
disagreements are laid out a lengthy point-counterpoint forum
that permit you to decide for yourself with a fair degree of
confidence, even without a background in physics and chemistry.
As it happens, it was a similar exchange in C&E News 20
years ago that did the most to deflate the "Yellow Rain"
controversy.)
The point is, such differences of opinion among periphery
and the core in science are not all that unusual. Usually some
narrowing of the distance takes place within a relatively short
period of time, as tests are devised, challenges posed, experiments
made and assessed.)
But not with low-brow "supply-side economics," any
more than in the matter of "Yellow Rain." Having allied
itself with heterodox opinion in economic matters, The Wall
Street Journal editorial page resolutely remained there, peddling
a grotesque caricature of Keynesian doctrine in which tax cuts
rather than deficit spending are continually necessary to prod
an otherwise stagnant economy, proclaiming at every stage that
the medicine was working. ("The triumph of faith over observation,"
as MIT's Robert Solow slyly put it to The New York Times
last week).
Bartley excoriated Reagan economic adviser Martin Feldstein
for his concern about the harm of long-term budget deficits
(though Feldstein continued to write for the page.) He beat
up on President George H. W. Bush, especially after he agreed
to raise taxes slightly on the even of the first Gulf War, in
order to strengthen America's financial position. Combined
with the effect of H. Ross Perot blistering away at the significance
of the deficit from the other flank, Bartley's rancor helped
cost Bush the 1992 election. (The Journal's preferred candidate
in 1992 was Congressman Jack Kemp and, in 1996, magazine publisher
Steve Forbes.)
And when Bill Clinton was elected, Bartley turned on him with
vitriol not seen in mainstream public discourse since the early
days of the Republic. Legend around Journal headquarters is
that Bartley greeted Clinton with open arms. That's bunk.
From the beginning, the editorial page was on him with no holds
barred, with the aid of enthusiastic readers in Arkansas (an
editorial page is "a community venture in which the audience
participates," as Bartley freely acknowledged).
The irony is that it turned out Bartley was right. Clinton
was, in some deep sense, accustomed to playing fast and loose.
He sought to staff his administration with personally loyal
retainers concealed behind professional managers. (Roger Altman
at Treasury, Webster Hubbell at Justice). He immediately set
about reversing the single proudest achievement of the Reagan
administration, the 1986 tax act with its two brackets and few
loopholes. He appointed his wife to revamp the 15 percent or
so of GDP that was the health-care sector, more or less secretly
and single-handedly.
But by ceding Clinton none of the prerogatives of leadership,
by offering him the benefit of no doubt, by hounding him and
his associates without mercy, they made him both more nimble
politically and more evasive. In 1992, Bartley published his
paean to the "supply-side" policies that he helped
devise, "The Seven Fat Years: And How to Do It Again,"
just before the Clinton administration put in train the first
of its ten even fatter years. The Democrats' success with
the economy seemed only to infuriate him. By the time impeachment
proceedings began, the cutting edge of virtually the entire
apparatus of government had been politicized by Bartley's
relentless editorials -- courts such as the Washington,
D.C. Court of Appeals and agencies such as the FBI included.
Worse, for all its skyscraper canyons, New York City is a
small town. The New York Times in the mid-1990s had passed into
the hands of an impressionable and insecure publisher, anxious
to make his mark. There is some reason to think that Bartley's
spectacular success drove The Times' editorial page to
adopt a similar strategy, in hopes of assembling an equally
attentive and influential audience. Under its editor, Howell
Raines, The Times editorial page, too, began taking increasingly
pugnacious positions. Usually they were opposite those of The
Wall Street Journal, but, on the subject of Bill Clinton, for
example, often they were the same and sometimes even more shrill.
In due course, Raines moved up to run the entire newspaper -- with famously bad results.
At the end of last year, Bob Bartley formally retired to write
a column. Columnist and long-time editorial writer Paul Gigot
replaced him. In all respects, the editorial page has become
a less aggressive and more tolerant place. The wishes of the
Bancroft family, which owns around 40 percent of Dow Jones,
appear to have been observed. (In a recent New Yorker article,
family trustee Roy Hammer told Ken Auletta that most of the
family "would have preferred a less acerbic editorial voice,"
but that nobody had "intruded" their judgment during Bartley's
reign.) The many men and women who Bartley trained have settled
down to run the shop, or have taken their skills to other newspapers.
The industry is better off for the diversity of opinion they
represent.
Last summer, Bartley let loose one last blast. "I think
we're coming to the end of an era of 'objectivity,'"
he wrote, a culture that had prevailed in journalism at least
for as long as he had been in the business. Only certain types
of persons want to be journalists, he asserted, and inevitably
they converged to an astonishing uniformity of view. Editors
could lean against this tendency to produce a single outlook,
but ultimately they were doomed to fail. "Since they are
increasingly dealing with subjective opinion, they should stop
wearing 'objectivity' on their sleeves."
Appearing in a newspaper that, throughout the period of time
he worked for it, set the industry standard for clear and persuasive
explanation, this was vintage Bartley: plausible and egregiously
wrong. Time and again, the news pages of the Wall Street Journal
undermined Bartley's more extreme positions, and those
of other crusaders, too, and doing so, earned readers'
trust. Of course there were occasional failures, too. Its coverage
of the insider trading scandals of the 1980s is now believed
to have missed the point. But during the years when Barley ran
the world's most influential opinion page, the news pages
of The Wall Street Journal produced steadier, more dependable,
less stroboscopic illumination.
The remarkable thing is that Bartley in those years was so
often right. In fact, he was usually right -- yet
the air of utter certainty with which he delivered his opinions
undermined the receptivity to them in some large fraction of
his audience, and excited the baser instincts of some other
part of the whole. The result was to move the scrum, to change
the consensus, but at considerable cost to civility.
And therein is the key to understanding Bob Bartley. The man
who most nearly resembles him these days -- the writer who
inherited his knack for galvanizing simplicity and clarity in
writing, for polarizing self-righteousness and contempt in analysis -- surely is Paul Krugman of The New York Times. Certainly
he offends those on the right who do not agree with him as deeply
and routinely as Bartley ever offended those on the left.
Yet already there is something unmistakably passé about
the debate. It is as if we know the outcome. A centrist Democrat
will retake the White House, either next year or in 2008, and
life in the modern mixed economy will go one as before.
It is hard to judge writers like Bartley and Krugman apart
from the spirit of their times. It may be that extremism is
something of a virtue when convictions are swiftly changing
all around. Pick a simple principle and stick to it -- "free
markets, free men" is the charge Bartley was given, and
he put it to work.
But the revolution, whatever it was, is pretty much over now.
The centrality of markets has been re-established, not just
in the industrial democracies, but all over the world. It is
time to start mopping up.