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August
31, 2003 |
David
Warsh, Editor |


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Five Years Later
The Russian economy is booming again. It was just five years
ago this month that its first frenzied post-communist expansion
ended in a debt default that brought the world currency system
to the brink of disaster. But its second, more orderly expansion
has turned Russia into one of the few bright spots in the global
picture for the past few years. The economy is expected to grow
7 percent this year alone -- stimulated by $30 per barrel oil.
Russia now rivals Saudi Arabia as the world's biggest petroleum
producer. A third of all Muscovites earn the average European
wage. Shopping centers are springing up on the outskirts of the
city. (Don't ask about the provinces!)
Three and a half years after he was elected president, Vladimir
Putin has brought a sense of stability to Russia, say Peter Baker
and Susan Glasser, Washington Post bureau chiefs in Moscow, writing
in the New Republic last month.
Now Putin is running for re-election next year -- promising to
double GDP by 2010, campaigning against the richest of the oligarchs,
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, of Yukos Oil Co.
So did Russia's transition from a central plan to a market economy
turn out all right after all?
Not according to Marshall Goldman, professor emeritus of economics
at Wellesley College and long-time associate director of Harvard's
Russian Research Center. Towards the end of his new book, The
Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry, Goldman
provides the following useful typology of the various scams worked
in "the wild and wooly East" since 1991, complete with
illustrations.
- Asset stripping (Gazprom is the most blatant but by no means
unique example);
- Share dilution of minority shareholders (Yukos, Sherbank,
Norilsk Nickel);
- Abuse of bankruptcy procedures (Tyumen Oil, Kondpetroleum,
Chernogorneft);
- Shell games with public bank deposits (Menatep, SBS/Agr);
- Mafia ejection of legal owners by force, threat or murder
(Subway Sandwich franchise in St. Petersburg, Norex Petroleum
in Siberia, Sawyer Research Products in Vladimir, the aluminum
industry in -- Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Smelters);
- Official intimidation, ejection or threat of imprisonment
by senior government officials (Far Eastern Shipping Co., Media-Most,
TV-6);
- Arbitrary seizure of mobile telephone frequencies (MSS Saratov);
- Hiding assets from the IMF (the Russian Central Bank);
- Rigged bids (LUKoil, Severnaia Neft, Loans for Shares program).
Truly, that is a remarkable menu of juicy business stories --
more than enough to put the Enron and WorldCom scandals in perspective,
and render potential investors in the Russian economy lingeringly
cautious. (Russian securities have yet to be declared investment
grade.) "Thus far the reform process in Russia can be considered
at best only a partial success," writes Goldman.
Then again, what ambitious policy undertaking is ever a complete
success -- especially on the scale of unwinding the failed experiment
that was the Soviet Union? Seventy-five years is a long time to
evolve forms of under-the-table behavior, where private enterprise
on the up-and-up was completely forbidden. Long before Russia
was exporting oil, she was sending crooks abroad -- to New York
City, for example, where they quickly raised the forgery of cab
medallions to a minor art form.
Goldman has a long history of well-deserved skepticism where
Russian developments are concerned. In five books over twenty
years, he has provided an unparalleled baseline narrative of the
political and economic outlook in the collection of fifteen diverse
republics that were the Soviet Union when he started -- and he
has done it in real time, as it happened. Consider:
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In 1983, his "USSR in Crisis: The Failure
of an Economic System" was exactly on target. The world's
largest exporter of grain had become its largest importer, he
wrote; the Soviets were rapidly falling behind the West in computer
technology. Yet its leaders were desperately afraid of reform.
If the Chinese were having difficulty breaking away from a system
that was only thirty years old, it would be far more difficult
for the same model after 65 years in the Soviet Union. Then
Mikhail Gorbachev replaced Konstantin Chernenko.
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In 1987 in "Gorbachev's Challenge: Economic
Reform in the Age of High Technology," Goldman correctly
predicted that Gorbachev would not be able to rise to the challenge
of "growing out of the plan" by pursuing massive investment
in heavy industry and military power. Instead he held out the
Chinese model as an alternative -- encouraging small-scale private
enterprise while retaining political control.
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He followed up in 1991 with "What Went
Wrong with Perestroika?" -- just in time for the failed
attempt to return Mikhail Gorbachev to power. Goldman explained
the rise of Boris Yeltsin this way: "For those of us living
outside the Soviet Union, it is hard to appreciate just how
disorienting have been the Gorbachev years, with all their course
reversals in industry, agriculture, administration and legislative
and economic advisers." Thus despite having withdrawn from
Afghanistan and ended Russia's domination of Eastern Europe,
Gorbachev was also the man who in early 1991sent paratroops
into Lithuania and six other republics in a vain attempt to
keep the Soviet Union from falling apart; and who, meanwhile,
turned a mild recession in the West into an outright Russian
depression -- a 15 percent decline in output brought on by an
unprecedented breakdown of trust among factories, farms and
ministries. It cost Gorbachev his job, and some part of his
place in history.
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Then in 1994, it was Goldman's turn to fall
behind the curve. In "Lost Opportunity: Why Economic Reforms
in Russia Have Not Worked," he argued against the enthusiasm
for "shock therapy" that had been embraced by Boris
Yeltsin -- at the very moment that it was rushing ahead. He
compared the gradualism of the Hungarian reforms with the "green-fieldization"
of Poland (the creation of new businesses) with the privatization
of state-owned businesses that was taking place in Russia. In
a nation like Russia, where the evils of capitalism had been
preached for 70 years, it was especially important to be seen
to proceed fairly, he wrote. But privatization swept ahead anyway,
aided by a corps of Western economists advising Yeltsin, who
argued that speed was of the essence. If the entire productive
apparatus were not privatized immediately, they reasoned, the
communists might regain power. And so it was -- with the result
that a relative handful of decisive Russian individuals came
to control an enormous fraction of the country's natural resources,
its banks and its media. These fifteen or twenty men quickly
became known as "oligarchs." They engineered the re-election
of Boris Yeltsin in 1996, and reaped further windfall gains
in return. Only after the 1998 fiscal crisis did Yeltsin appoint
Putin prime minister -- with the clear intent that he should
succeed to the presidency in 2000.
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Now Goldman is back. In "The Piratization
of Russia" he argues that rapid privatization chosen by
the Russian leadership and pushed by the Americans was the "wrong
advice at the wrong time." Russia has fared "much
worse" than other European transition economies, he says;
only Belarus and Ukraine have done worse. Its economy has shrunk
to about half of what it had been in Gorbachev's time. A third
of the population lives below the poverty line. With so few
rich and so many poor, cynicism has only grown. "Accusations
that two of the main U.S. consultants to the privatization officials
were actively lining their pockets
did nothing to enhance
the effort to lessen corruption and curb political influence."
A US government case against Harvard University and Andrei Shleifer
and Jonathan Hay, the leaders of its State Department-sponsored
mission to Moscow, is pending
decision by a Federal judge.
This difference of opinion about Russia's a transition will
be a long time straightening out. There is no point in expecting
the parties to the debate -- the policy economists on the one
hand, the "Sovietologists" and their numerous allies
on the other -- to do anything more than state their case. And
this Goldman has done, clearly and simply. At 72, he is an irreplaceable
grand old man. So who among the next generation will decide? The
Europeans, with their several centers for generating knowledge
for and about transition economies, will strive to narrow the
debate. Then there is Russia's own fledgling Center for Economic
and Financial Research. And a new generation of models of looting
behavior eventually will be brought to bear to weigh competing
claims -- they were developed originally to describe the US savings
and loan scandal. (In "The Chastening," Paul Blustein
reports that IMF bankers in Russia grew really alarmed when the
heard Ukraine described by knowledgeable lenders as "the
next moral hazard play.") Nor is the transition debate simply
an argument about the past. Perhaps the most important wholesale
transition left is Cuba. But the details of institutional engineering
and mechanism design are at issue today in every country in the
world.
In the meantime, there is Russia, five years out from having
nearly crashed the global financial system. There may have been
a better way to deal with the development of Texas, too. But Texas
today is what we have today. Edna Ferber wrote the novel "Giant"
in the 1950s to explain Texas culture to the world (it made a
pretty good movie, too). And of course there was the 1980s television
series "Dallas." Similarly, there is nothing quite like
a first-rate novel to supply powerful images of present-day Russia,
William Gibson's recent "Pattern Recognition" being
a good case in point. But mostly we make do with journalism --
see the precis
of the series of ten articles in the Financial Times during August
(subscription required for full text) for a sterling example.
Those Russian oligarchs are going to be a major presence on the
scene -- and, often enough, a headache -- for a long time to come.
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