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Searching for the "Sane Deep Self"
Suppose we all had kitchen gardens. Now would be
the time for poring over catalogs, starting seedlings under glass,
thinning those already sprouted, building tents for early strawberries,
pruning fruit trees, cutting back berry bushes, setting out old
clothes and otherwise getting ready for spring. By April we would
be outdoors, on our hands and knees, planting, weeding, digging,
mowing. By July we would be working on salads and soups for our
families and friends.
Instead, I have been trying to keep track of the
back-stories of "The Bachelorette" and "Joe Millionaire,"
so I can talk to my daughter and her friends. With 40 million viewers,
Fox Television's "Millionaire" pulled the network's biggest
non-sports audience ever Monday night. That's a lot of potential
conversations.
But I spend much of my life around economists, and
most of them consider it nonsense when I say that I wish I were
gardening instead of actually choosing to watch TV. Their skeptical
stance is a matter of principle. It goes back, at least, to Bernard
Mandeville, who nearly 200 years ago wrote:
"I don't call things Pleasures which Men say
are best, but such as they seem to be most pleased with; how can
I believe that a Man's chief Delight is in the Embellishments of
the Mind, when I see him ever employ'd about and daily pursue the
Pleasures that are contrary to them?"
This doctrine that real preferences are revealed
in actual choices has ruled the roost in economics ever since Paul
Samuelson codified it in Foundations of Economic Analysis
in 1947 as the standard approach to consumer choice. Interpersonal
comparisons of utility already had been ruled out of bounds -- no
economist worth his salt was prepared to argue that farmers gained
more from a protective tariff than consumers lost.
Now all preferences and desires were officially equally
valid. There was no reasonable way to prefer one to another. It
was only a short step to the recent enthusiasm for taxes that treat
all assets classes alike. There was no point in granting tax subsidies
to, say, those who owned homes.
The effect of Samuelson's postulate -- refined over
the years by some of the most subtle minds of economics -- was to
give new life to the old adage that, at least among economists,
there can be no disputing tastes. They simply are what they are.
Before long, Milton Friedman was confidently asserting, "The
economist has little to say about the formation of wants; this is
the province of the psychologist. The economist's task is to trace
the consequences of any given set of wants."
Of course, all the while the assumption has been
under fire. Whether it was John Kenneth Galbraith's arguments that
corporations freely created new appetites or Christian von Weizsacker's
opposite conjecture that perhaps corporations were altogether too
accepting of existing tastes, economists in the '60s, raised plenty
of doubts about the conventional wisdom.
Then in the '70s and '80s, economists ranging from
Amartya Sen to Burton Weisbrod to Gary Becker, sociologists led
by Jon Elster, not to mention philosophers, psychologists, political
theorists and others of that ilk, proffered formal models of preference
formation. Not that the profession is ready to formally surrender
on the issue yet. But the old consensus has been taking fire in
a way that makes you think that it is just a matter of time before
economists begin systematically offering an account of how our wants
arise and change over time.
A good example of such an attempt is Preference
Pollution: How Markets Create the Desires We Dislike,
the book from which this little sketch is drawn. David George, a
professor of economics at LaSalle University, is a forceful and
lively mind. The capacity to have preferences about our preferences
is precisely what makes us human, he says, following the philosopher
Harry Frankfurt.
So quite aside from what we want or choose or are
moved to do, George says, the more interesting questions
have to do with how our deeper and more reflective desires are channeled
and allowed to operate -- second-order preferences, he calls them,
in that they consist of different goals.
George argues that "un-preferred preferences,"
inculcated by market participants, have begun to gain the upper
hand over second-order preferences, as social institutions that
traditionally have served to alleviate the mismatch between them
and our deeper desires have weakened with the dramatic turn towards
markets of the last thirty years.
Many of the arguments here are of a sort that only
a professional logician could love. Does personal autonomy presuppose
the existence of a "sane deep self," as the philosopher
Susan Wolf has argued? Or are humans better understood in terms
of "multiple" selves, each simultaneously possessing several
different rankings of the same elements?
Such a model is very different from a first-and-second
order preference conception, warns George. It presupposes the existence
of a paternalistic Self, routinely acting to prevent the Self itself
from choosing what he really prefers -- Ulysses lashing himself
to the mast to resist the Sirens' song, in a famous example.
But individual techniques of self-control such as
these -- locking the refrigerator after dinner or never drinking
before 6 P.M. -- may be a poor way to understand the social dimension
of preferences. Individuals may speak of "having" a preference,
he says, but courts of law don't treat preferences as a property
right. They are much more nearly like those phenomena that economists
call externalities -- what the rest of us describe as "spillovers."
Viewed through this lens, the institutions that most
deeply affect our second order preferences are those that constitute
great subtle networks in society, for good and ill. They are generally
less functional than the common language that we share, which is
surely the most wondrous network of all. And they probably impinge
less visibly than the harmful external effects to which George compares
them -- pollution and congestion.
But they are only slightly less difficult to avoid.
They are typified by the "reality" shows that suddenly
have overgrown primetime television like algae in a pond. According
to George, they include phenomena as diverse as fast food restaurants,
suburbs that necessitate automobiles to get from place to place,
adventurous sexual mores, spectator sports, the heightened appetite
for gambling games and the surge of easy consumer credit.
Meanwhile, old-fashioned intermediaries whose role
was to shape our choices have declined in significance -- the high
school teacher, the television network, the influential critic of
the arts, the mortgage banker, the cleric, the town fathers, the
League of Women Voters. The result is that our "better selves"
today are exposed almost exclusively to market forces that have
been specifically designed to loosen self-reliance and self-control.
Instead of planning kitchen gardens, we have 40 million people tuning
in to watch good-looking young men and women traveling in limousines
between hotel rooms and empty houses to their dates.
I'm not sure that David George has the right answers
to this problem, with his pollution metaphor and graphical representations
of "market failures" of various sorts. The word "network,"
I think, does not appear in his book. But I feel quite certain that
he and the others like him are asking the right questions.
Economists have proved very good these last thirty
years at taking down barriers to transactions between consenting
adults. Before long, they may face the challenge of putting some
of them back up -- the civic equivalents of the guard rails that
we take for granted on our highways.
These necessary safeguards may turn out to be exotic
and as yet unimagined. Then again, they may resemble relatively
simple institutions that we already know well -- public schools,
a citizen army, government watchdogs, capable police, corporate
pensions, universal health insurance and, perhaps, even write-offs
for houses and their kitchen gardens.
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