What will happen if one of the brightest and most
beguiling economists in the world turns out to be a world-class
scoundrel, too?
Andrei Shleifer's stature as an economist is common
knowledge. Among the Harvard professor's more striking accomplishments
was a 1997 article, "The Limits to Arbitrage," in which
he and his friend University of Chicago Business School professor
Rob Vishny anticipated in some detail the kind of liquidity crisis
that a year later would bring to its knees the giant hedge fund
known as Long Term Capital Management -- only to be assured that
it couldn't possibly happen, by those to whom it soon did.
In books like "The Grabbing Hand: Government
Pathologies and their Cures" and "Without a Map: Political
Tactics and Economic Reform in Russia," he set a high standard
for disentangling the problems of communism and capitalism and
bringing them into comparative perspective, thereby illuminating
various pathways to transition. And in a series of original papers
on corporate governance, he comprehensively surveyed possibilities
for managerial misconduct, its remedies (and opportunities) in
stock markets, and so influenced the worldwide takeover debate.
In 1999, he won the John Bates Clark medal in 1999,
an award presented every two years to the leading economist under
40. Last year he was named editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives,
the American Economic Association's flagship organ for general-interest
explication of the latest research.
And lest there were any question of resting on
his laurels, Shleifer was everywhere at meetings of the AEA earlier
this month, presenting or discussing papers on behavioral finance,
sovereign debt, law and transition, the regulation of labor, investor
protection and the new comparative economics, of which he is a
founding father.
A friend says, "He can do Chicago, he can
do MIT, he can do the real world stuff -- there are not many others
like him.'' Pretty remarkable for a young man who grew up in the
Soviet Union, arrived in Rochester, New York, only in 1976 and
was swept off to Harvard College two years later, speaking (he
jokes) little more than the English he had learned watching Charlie's
Angels.
The trouble is that Shleifer is also a defendant
in a high-stakes lawsuit that could cost Harvard University more
than $100 million. The US government charges that he misbehaved
as leader of the university's US government-sponsored mission
to Moscow in the mid-1990s -- specifically, that he quietly began
buying Russian securities almost immediately after his appointment,
despite strict contract prohibitions against such conflicts of
interest.
Worse, the government asserts that while he and
his deputy, Jonathan Hay, were advising the Russian government
on how to set up its markets and create a Securities and Exchange
Commission, their Significant Others (wife and then-girlfriend-now
wife, respectively) illegitimately obtained from the Russian government
the first license to operate a mutual fund there.
Harvard recently settled for an undisclosed sum
with a Maine financial services firm that had sued the university
and its team, claiming it had been improperly elbowed aside in
the race for that permission.
All the while, the government says, employees of
the Harvard project were raising red flags about their bosses'
conduct. They were ignored in Cambridge. And when one bold consultant
flew home to raise the issue with Shleifer directly, the economist
ordered her fired.
After whistleblowers finally succeeded in raising
the issue with the government directly in 1997, the US Agency
for International Development fired Harvard from its contract.
Thereupon the Russian government, angered by the loss of the services
of its friends, spurned further US aid.
After a lengthy investigation, the US attorney
in Boston filed suit in September 2000 on behalf of the government,
seeking treble damages from Harvard for its failure to keep tabs
on its employees. The government asserts the whole value of the
$34.8 million contract was lost. Harvard contends that its team
did a great job.
The case is being argued before Judge Douglas Woodlock
in US District Court in Boston. Both sides have asked him to rule
in their favor on the basis of the reams of testimony that has
been given. He has the option of deciding all the case or some
of it, and sending the rest to a jury.
The essence of Shleifer's defense, and that of
Harvard, has been to portray the episode as a series of misunderstandings
of fine points of law. Never has it risen to the level of the
reply that Shleifer gave to a Moscow colleague who raised objections
at the time -- that in Russia, "above suspicion" was
difficult to achieve. And whatever the verdict, the mass of evidence
that has been accumulated reflects remarkably poorly on the Harvard
mission.
Quite apart from what is decided about the case
itself, there is a relatively simple way to address the problem
of Shleifer's standing in the economics profession. He should
go back to where he came from -- return, that is, to the Graduate
School of Business at the University of Chicago. Certainly it
is hard to imagine that he will continue to teach at Harvard.
The Chronicle of Higher Education subscriber-only
"Daily Report" reported last week that Shleifer was
actively negotiating with New York University's Stern School of
Business. Citing "a source familiar with the negotiations,"
the Chronicle said that the Stern school had offered nearly $500,000
in salary.
Shleifer, the report continued, had been "spending
time in the business school's finance department over the last
several months, giving lectures and talking to faculty members."
Shleifer is on leave from Harvard for the academic year.
New York University has made some impressive hires
recently; luring theorist Thomas Sargent from Stanford, strategist
Adam Brandenburger from Harvard Business School, development economist
William Easterly from the World Bank, historian Niall Ferguson
from Oxford, among others. Its newly-created Center for Experimental
Social Science already includes a number of talented researchers
and is expected to grow substantially.
Then again, greatly as NYU's economics department
and business school have risen in the relative standings in recent
years, the atmosphere around Washington Square is still that of
a boomtown. NYU's big bang could become a big bust; its fancy
new faculty leave for still-greener pastures as quickly as they
arrive. Students will have their doubts about the training ethic
there.
A better solution, at least for economics, would
be for Shleifer to return to the Graduate School of Business at
Chicago. That was where he was before he accepted Harvard's offer.
He made his name there. It is his spiritual home. At Chicago,
he could continue to exercise a significant influence on the profession,
train top-notch students, stay in touch with the latest developments
-- and benefit from the university's reputation for enforcing
probity among its faculty.
Why leave Harvard at all? He may be bored. Besides,
there's a monitoring problem. The Harvard economics department
is so eager for him to stay that it may be only too willing to
turn a blind eye to his transgressions, for in combination with
professors John Campbell and Jeremy Stein and others, not to mention
those at the Harvard Business School, he gives them an unassailable
claim to being the best finance section in the world.
Then, too, Shleifer's oldest friend in economics
is Lawrence Summers -- who, first as Undersecretary of Treasury
for International Affairs, then as Deputy Secretary, was to all
intents and purposes his ultimate boss during the period of the
alleged transgressions, even though they were separated by several
layers of governmental hierarchy.
Maybe Shleifer simply didn't understand what it
meant to supply impartial advice with no conflict of interest
under American rules. But in that case, what was Larry Summers
thinking, then and now? Today he is president of the university.
Harvard's continuing contention that its team leaders did nothing
wrong requires some explaining far beyond what it has offered
in its briefs.
For even if Shleifer's alleged indiscretions arose
from a relatively understandable itch to get rich -- remember,
he was a college junior when Ronald Reagan was elected president
-- Harvard's dogged defense of its Russia Project has transformed
the matter into something completely different -- the legal equivalent,
perhaps, of George Armstrong Custer's choice of the Little Big
Horn as the place to plant his flag. Already Summers' reputation
has been damaged by the scandal. What happens if the judge decides
against Harvard?
A great deal remains to be seen.