One of the most interesting aspects of the new-fangled
tradition cited by the Nobel Foundation last week is the difficulty
-- at least on the surface -- that experimental economics has
had over the years in establishing an institutional identity.
Considering that a single experiment designed to
investigate, say, attitudes towards risk, can take $50,000 in
ready cash to provide incentives for its subjects, requires a
big computer lab and often fails, you'd think that success would
have required a university prepared to back a program to the hilt
through degrees, appointments and big budgets. And you would be
partly right.
Yet the developments that were honored last week
actually unfolded some 40 years ago. The award went to a man who
has wandered from place to place. And only relatively recently
have the foremost universities begun to invest in the kind of
computer labs that the Nobel citation described as "wind
tunnels" designed to test economic mechanisms.
Understand that the Nobel Award in Economics this
year recognizes two new and very different sub-fields, behavioral
economics and experimental economics.
Daniel Kahneman, a professor of psychology and
public policy at Princeton University, was honored (and his research
partnership with the late Amos Tversky was cited) for beginning
the work of pinning down certain apparently universal quirks in
human judgment that routinely affect economic behavior.
Vernon Smith of George Mason University was recognized
for showing how replicable experiments with human participants
could be used both in research and teaching to uncover why markets
work the way they do -- counter to the received wisdom in many
quarters that no such experiments were possible.
The two sub-disciplines were compared by Ross Miller,
author of Paving
Wall Street, a popular recent book on experimental economics,
to the differing perspectives of cell physiology and evolutionary
biology -- life viewed from opposite ends of a telescope. Behavioral
economics tends to focus on the tastes, values and cognitive abilities
of individuals. Experimental economics investigates the operation
of markets as a whole.
In both cases, the idea is to formulate small groups
of subjects under carefully-controlled conditions, in order to
study everything from the outcomes of different kinds of auctions
to the tendency of "free-riders" to enjoy public goods
without paying for them. The payoff most often comes when experimenters
with different preconceptions criticize and seek to duplicate
each others' work.
Both enterprises are a considerable departure from
the time-honored economic tradition of reasoning from the general
to the particular -- the assuming of can-openers whenever necessary,
as if it solved the problem, as in the punch-line of the old joke.
But aside from the inductive tendencies they share,
behavioral and experimental economics have little else in common,
at least at the present time. There are relatively few cross-citations
in their respective literatures. And the feeling is widespread
that neither field has yet fully coalesced. This year's Nobel
Award is almost certainly a compromise, designed to get both specialties
on the map.
The experimental approach is somewhat harder to
understand -- after all, everybody's an armchair psychologist.
For a full discussion of its many skeins, consult Alvin Roth's
introduction to the Handbook
of Experimental Economics.
"Many contemporary experimental economists
carry around with them different and very partial accounts of
the history of the field," Roth wrote. But then the great
thing about the Nobel Award is that it settles on one of these
stories and personalizes it.
Experimental economics had its modern origins in
the Harvard classroom of Edward Chamberlin. A great star of the
1930s and '40s, Chamberlin was a determined critic of doctrines
of perfect competition.
Elements of monopolistic behavior, he argued, pervaded
the market for nearly every good whose characteristics were differentiated,
even slightly, from all others. Even gasoline sold on one street
corner was different from gasoline sold on another, he said. Most
firms were able to manipulate the kinds of products they sold,
as well as their prices and quantities.
At one point, Chamberlin devised a classroom experiment
to "prove" the impossibility of perfect competition.
He passed out cards to his graduate students, marked with price
caps for the buyers, floors (or reservation prices) for the sellers.
He instructed the possessors to circulate, pair up and make deals.
The strike prices, reported to Chamberlin, were
posted on a blackboard. And the results, usually at odds with
the implicit schedules of supply and demand that the professor
had drawn up beforehand (based on the values he assigned), were
said to show how little competition mattered.
Enter Vernon Smith, an electrical engineer from
California Institute of Technology with a masters in economics
from the University of Kansas. Smith came to Harvard to get his
economics PhD. He sat in on Chamberlin's experiment, and like
the others in the class, disparaged it.
But a couple years later, in the autumn of 1955,
Smith found himself awake at 3 a.m., thinking of Chamberlin's
"silly" experiment. He was an assistant professor at
Purdue University, teaching four sections of elementary economics
to undergraduates What if he changed the rules to make the classroom
experiment a little more like a real market?
Specifically, he wondered, what if each trader's
quotations were called out to the entire trading group, buyers
and sellers alike, instead of being the subject of myriad two-way
conversations? And what if the trading sessions were strung out
over a series of "days," instead of confined to a single
period, in order that buyers and sellers could learn from experience?
Maybe then, he could avoid repeating "the textbook supply-and-demand
song-and-dance."
Smith ran the revised experiment -- a "double
auction," because it featured both bid and asked prices --
for the first time in January of 1956. The outcome was just the
opposite of what Edward Chamberlin had expected -- and exactly
what competitive price theory said the result should be. Prices
rapidly converged to an equilibrium, close to the values predicted
by theory, even though the students lacked the information necessary
the calculate the overall result. Naturally, Smith didn't believe
his results. So he ran another version, and another.
By 1960, he was ready to publish his results. He
wrote them up and sent them to the Journal of Political Economy
-- the same place Chamberlin had published news of his experiment
a few years before. The Chicago economists who published the journal
would love the results, he reasoned. After all, he had shown that
the market worked under much weaker conditions than previously
had been thought. A few traders, operating with strict privacy,
with little learning and no experience, could make it work.
"A great discovery, right? Not quite, as it
turned out," Smith later wrote. The paper was dismissed,
and dismissed again. "At Chicago they already knew that markets
work. Who needs evidence?"
Only when editor Harry Johnson overruled three
referees (presumably Milton Friedman was among them) was the paper
finally published. Smith's memoir can be found in "Essays
in Contemporary Fields of Economics," edited by George Horwich
and James Quirk, and published "In honor of Emanuel T. Weiler."
Purdue in the late 1950s was one of the most exciting
economic centers in the world, and Em Weiler was the reason why.
An economist by training and an entrepreneur by nature, Weiler
came to Purdue from the University of Illinois in 1953, after
the Illini economics department had gone super-nova. Weiler managed
to turn an undergraduate service department into a sophisticated
theoretical PhD program and merge the resulting economics department
into a business school without creating a fracas -- though his
professors were known to the old-line engineering faculty as "the
Strange Ones."
It was a banner time. The raft of new techniques
being developed in mathematical economics was viewed with suspicion
by the nation's more established universities. The potential of
computers to transform analysis was understood by few. Through
clever recruiting, Weiler built a research center that, for a
time, rivaled the other great start-up in the years after World
War II -- that at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Thus the department that Vernon Smith joined in
the autumn of 1955 included Stanley Reiter, Lance Davis and Jonathan
Hughes, who were applying quantitative methods to economic history
in the project that came to be known as cliometrics. George Horwich,
Jim Quirk and Ed Ames were moving aggressively beyond the frontiers
established by John Hicks and Paul Samuelson into the methods
of dynamic programming and general equilibrium that in the 1970s
would take economics by storm.
Cowles Commission nabobs Jacob Marschak and Leonid
Hurwicz served as unofficial godfathers to the Purdue department.
Sooner or later virtually every math econ scholar in the world
came to West Lafayette to talk. A stream of talented graduate
students included Morton Kamien, John Ledyard, Nathan Rosenberg,
Nancy Schwartz and John Wood. With his wavy blonde hair, his motorcycle,
and his enthusiasm for all problems economic, Vernon Smith was
an exotic addition to the pack.
Alas, it didn't last. Smith left Purdue for Brown
University in 1967. The next year he moved to the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, which was starting an ambitious program
in mathematical economics. Many of the Purdue economists moved
to Northwestern University. Quirk went to Caltech. Em Weiler gravitated
towards business, became ill, and untimely died. West Lafayette
regressed toward the mean of Big Ten universities.
One of the last to arrive in Purdue in its heyday
was Charles Plott, a freshly-minted PhD from the University of
Virginia who wanted to learn some mathematical economics. He and
Smith taught a course together, and Plott acquired a lively interest
in laboratory methods. Smith went back East and, in due course,
Plott followed Quirk to Caltech.
When the experiment in department-building at UMass
unexpectedly blew up, Plott and Quirk brought Smith to Caltech.
He had been an undergraduate there twenty-five years before, and
for a time social science at the Pasadena campus enjoyed a golden
age. By some accounts, Smith had stopped working on experimentation
before he arrived. By other accounts, his interest remained avid
all along. In any event, his California sojourn in 1973-75 was
highly stimulating, and work with Plott and their student Ross
Miller quickly produced seminal new results.
Efforts to keep Smith in Southern California failed.
He accepted an offer to build a new center for experimental economics
at the University of Arizona in Tucson. Plott continue to build
the experimental programs at Caltech. Had the Swedes chosen not
to combine the honors for experimental and behavioral economics
in a single award, presumably Plott would have shared the prize
with Smith.
But experimental economics in the '70s was becoming
a very different place. Game theory had opened vast new possibilities
for investigation. Economic theory and experimentation had become
a two-way street. The National Science Foundation funded a number
of laboratories around the country. A new generation of graduate
students, unburdened by the doctrinal battles of the '50s and
'60s, walked on and began using new techniques with great success.
And when Alvin Roth addressed a World Congress
of the Econometric Society in 1985, he was able to divide the
exploding literature of experimental economics into three broad
categories, depending on investigators' aims. There were "speaking
to theorists," "searching for facts" and "whispering
in the ears of princes." He still had material left over
for the category, "searching for meaning."
If there's a moral here, perhaps it has to do with
the difficulty of sustaining first-rate social science in universities
overseen by state legislatures. The flowering at Purdue got its
start only when legislators launched a communist witch-hunt at
the University of Illinois, 75 miles away across the state-line.
Purdue's bloom faded from more natural causes, but the University
of Massachusetts flirtation with math-econ ended in failure. Arizona
built its university swiftly and imaginatively, especially under
governor Bruce Babbitt. By early '90s, however, the legislature
had turned on it and aggressively cut Tucson's budget -- pruning,
but not eliminating, its world-class economics lab.
Last year Vernon Smith decamped for the former
junior college turned star-packed multiversity that is Virginia's
George Mason University -- yet another state school, albeit a
highly successful one.
Leadership in experimental economics has been migrating
to the nation's private universities. Harvard hired Alvin Roth
from the University of Pittsburgh in 1995. Stanford is building
an extensive new capability. So is New York University. Centers
around the world -- Barcelona, Bonn, Jerusalem, Osaka, Hong Kong
-- routinely contribute top talent and compete successfully for
hires. "We've won the battle for the journals," says
Roth, "but not yet the battle of departments." Caltech,
despite the tiny coterie of barely fifteen social scientists on
its faculty remains the discipline's spiritual home.
Important policy results now routinely emanate
from experimental laboratories. The possibility of speculative
bubbles has been all but nailed down. Those who insist the market
"always gets it right" no longer get a hearing, and
much work is directed at policies (most of them having to do with
supplying or adducing information) that would diminish the likelihood
of various kinds of speculative frenzy. How about auctions for
initial public offerings? How about futures markets for individual
stocks?
The hot topic of the moment is reputation. Those
little buyers' ratings that are beginning to appear in e-commerce
are as old in principle as the Better Business Bureau. But interpreted
digitally and in terms of public policy, they herald a better
way of dealing of markets in which the existence of "lemons"
is a threat. See, for example, Eliciting
Honest Feedback in Electronic Markets.
Meanwhile, at 75, Vernon Smith is economics' newest
celebrity. He sports a pony tail and indulges in tastes acquired
in Tucson for cowboy boots, noisy bars and the Texas two-step.
He quotes Kahil Gibran. Sometimes he writes in blank verse himself.
Smith has become a thoroughly romantic figure, the kind that his
old friend the economic historian Jonathan Hughes lionized in
The
Vital Few, a classic paean to entrepreneurs.
But experimental economics itself, once lonely
and easily ridiculed, has become a lively and thickly-populated
field. And Smith's primitive experiment, the double oral auction,
increasingly performed in classrooms around the world, has become
as powerful a demonstration that markets work as is life experience
itself.