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A Problem Solved
Does economics make progress? The hoary old question
was a perennial for many years. You don't hear it so much any more.
One reason is a steady accumulation of practical developments. A
good example is the modern monetary system.
In a few short years in the late 20th century, plastic
cards with magnetic stripes replaced folding money in consumers'
wallets for most purposes and the transition from hard money to
fiat money was complete.
Bookkeeping entries in bank computers, carefully
guaranteed and linked by an intricate web of telecommunications
apparatus reliably supported a global economy of unimaginable complexity.
And the days when coins contained precious metals seemed very far
way.
Yet it was only in 1964 that the US stopped minting
coins containing 90 percent silver. Nearly 15 billion circulating
dimes, quarters, half- and silver dollars (face value $2.6 billion)
then quickly disappeared from circulation in the late 1960s, melted
down for ingots by (felonious) entrepreneurs or squirreled away
by collectors as the price of silver rose during the inflation associated
with the Vietnam War.
By 1970 they were gone.
Just as quickly -- and virtually unnoticed by almost
everybody who wasn't minting or melting money at the time -- they
had been replaced by today's "clad" coins, composed mostly
of copper and zinc, whose intrinsic value as commodity metal is
far less than their value in trade. As coins overnight became mere
tokens, their hoarding finally ceased altogether in the US. Periodic
buying and selling of household silver and gold has continued to
be an important fact of life in India and Saudi Arabia to the present
day.
It is easy to forget that experience with coins,
not banks, drove monetary policy for many centuries. Combining different
metals of varying relative values in one unified system was government's
central monetary problem for hundreds of years.
The evolution of the general principles governing
an orderly coinage that today we take for granted is the subject
of an ingenious new book by Thomas Sargent and Francois Velde, The
Big Problem of Small Change. The book describes the gradual
discovery, through a lengthy process of trial and error, of the
"standard formula" by which almost all governments today
regulate their currency and coins.
And what is that standard formula? Relatively simple,
say Sargent and Velde. Monetary authorities set the various prices,
then maintain total convertibility among denominations at fixed
rates -- four quarters to one dollar, two dimes and a nickel to
one quarter. The public then chooses the quantities of money to
be supplied.
Government also regulates the overall quantity of
"base money" -- the total amount of government-issued
currency and coin in circulation -- with a view to keeping the general
level of prices fairly stable over time. These days oversight takes
the form of sophisticated manipulation of bank reserves and short-term
lending rates, as well as various open-market operations, buying
and selling its reserves.
Today's recipe for monetary order is simple only
in contrast to the way it used to be. Until about 1850, the system
generally worked the other way around. Coins of various denominations
consisted of so many lumps of precious metal of different types.
Markets, not governments, set the exchange rates among them.
The result was more or less continuous crises --
shortages of coins one decade, rapid changes in relative prices
among precious metals the next, large flows of coins across national
borders the decade after.
It was these problems that the standard approach
to was slowly devised to address. And by the beginning of the 20th
century, it did,
An odd topic for a top theorist? Sargent is a professor
of economics at Stanford University and a senior fellow of the Hoover
Institution there. He was a major contributor to the remarkable
but recondite debates about the significance of government credibility
for the conduct of monetary policy that took place among university
economists during the 1970s and '80s.
There is nothing odd about his latest venture, though,
when you when you recall the title Sargent's previous book, The
Conquest of American Inflation, which appeared
in 1999. Then he was concerned with explaining and evaluating the
effort in which he had participated to build a rigorous foundation
beneath the age-old insight into the conduct of monetary policy
whose gist often has been summarized in the punchline of a familiar
joke.
Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame
on me.
Since the 1980s, monetary theory mainly has had to
do with the design of frameworks that might shield central bankers
from the highly human temptation to play the "fooling game."
The idea is to induce them to rein in more effectively on inflation.
In The Big Problem of Small Change, Sargent
undertakes to put in historical perspective the lengthy process
by which the steadily growing economies of the West learned to successfully
conduct a different policy, namely the vast improvement on the full-bodied
money (meaning the gold standard, for example) that today we call
fiat money.
Fiat, from the Latin phrase meaning "Let it
be done," translates loosely when applied to money as "Trust
me, it's worth what it say it is." In truth, the story of the
rise of paper money -- now plastic and digital money -- makes a
fascinating reading.
The book began in a friendly argument between Sargent
and his friend Velde, a senior economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago who is also a lecturer at the University of Chicago.
Carlo Cippola, the great economic historian of the
Middle Ages, had described to an audience the centuries-long process
of trial and error that had led to the modern system. Sargent argued
that authorities failed at the task of supplying small change because
they didn't understand the process. Velde countered that the problem
surely was that policy makers in earlier times lacked a reliable
means of making coins that were hard to counterfeit.
Thus began a beguiling project. Sargent and Velde
braid together strands from the history of ideas, of technology,
and of monetary policy -- but with an important further twist. To
make their argument as strong as possible, they employ throughout
the book a mathematical model, adapted from a Robert Lucas 1982
paper, "Interest Rates and Currency Prices in a Two-Country
World."
The idea is to underscore the choices confronting
policy makers at every turn. The algebra's demands far exceed the
effort that most economists -- and presumably all of us non-economists
-- are willing or able to make.
The episodes discussed could hardly be more colorful
and diverse -- the sudden expansion of Venetian trade through the
issue of lightweight torneselli in Greece in the 14th century,
the Kipper- und Wipperzeit ("the clipping and culling
times" in 17th century Germany, the debate over England's Great
Recoinage of 1696.
The great learning episodes about the power of fiat
money seem to have come during periods of siege, especially in Castille
and Catalonia, when authorities were forced to make copper do the
work of gold. They discovered that money with no intrinsic value
could work just as well as precious metal.
The application of formal reasoning to these episodes
is itself a reassuring demonstration that history applies to math
every bit as much as math applies to history. The use of the model
as an engine for thinking is itself is a large part of the effort
to demonstrate how learning takes place in economics.
I don't know exactly who can be expected to read
this book. Certainly serious students of economics. Reviewers with
more time and space to convey the arguments than I have here. But
perhaps some vacationers will enjoy it, too, at least those who
already have an interest in the history of banking.
The Big Problem of Small Change is a beautiful
book. Its approach to the history of money is that of a pair of
very stylish detectives working on building a case. The memory of
hard money itself exercises a certain fascination. And the way Sargent
and Velde deploy the now-standard apparatus of technical economics
seems as rhetorically powerful as a siege gun.
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